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Abstract
This article seeks to investigate the problem of modernity in post-war communist 
Poland (People’s Republic of Poland, Pol.: Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa, PRL) through 
the prism of concepts and ideas of model family and possibilities of shaping it, as 
promoted in the expert discourse and guidance practices. On the interpretation 
level, it is important to refer to modern – that is, rational and expert knowledge-
propelled – social control methods, strictly connected with the concepts or ideas 
of modern society. The crucial aspect is the tension between biopolitics understood 
in terms of actions and strategies of modern dictatorship devised to control 
a population and the concepts of modernity that appeared in expert discourses in 
the context of, i.a., decreasing natality, modern birth control methods or practices 
related to maternity/paternity. Analysed are experts’ opinions proving dominant 
in the discourse, including the arguments put forth at sessions of the Family 
Council and the Planned Parenthood Association.
Keywords: biopolitics, modernisation, pro-natalistic policy, People’s Republic of 
Poland, history of family
I
INTRODUCTION
A spirited debate on the demographic dimensions of the development 
of Polish society and the related threats and opportunities ran through 
the Polish mass media beginning with the early 1970s. Experts 
proposed their most diverse, oftentimes extremely different stances; 
however, opinions advocating the need to resume a proactive policy 







Juvenility in the streets of our cities, young people literally storming the 
tertiary schools and workplaces, and the long years young couples have to 
wait to get a place to live – all virtually prevent the average citizen from 
cracking a thought that, as the case is with a number of other countries, 
the proportion of children in the society has decreased and the Polish 
society’s demography has rather poor prospects for the future. This is the 
knowledge of experts and of those willing to know. The demographic data 
for the recent years and the procreative attitudes among young mothers 
tell us that the youthfulness of our society, so strongly outstanding, may 
quickly pass away and our streets will gradually be fi lled with maturity 
and senility. This is of concern not only for demographers, politicians, 
pedagogues and clergymen: it instils sadness to anyone who is enamoured 
of the street, breathing with life and youthfulness.1
Among the many utterances so neutral and (as indicated by the 
above quote) evidencing a fear of depopulation, published at the time 
by periodicals such as Słowo Powszechne, Tygodnik Powszechny, or 
Perspektywy,2 the opinion of Zbigniew Smoliński, who was enthusiastic 
about the social transformation then taking place in Poland, stood out. 
In his popularising articles, interviews and expert studies published 
in specialist periodicals (namely, Studia Demografi czne and Wiadomości 
Statystyczne), he assuaged the mounting worries by indicating that 
Poland has entered the area of optimal reproduction, the fertility of Polish 
families recorded those days at 2.2–2.3 children would ensure increas-
ing peopling of the country at least to the year 2000.3 In Smoliński’s 
opinion, all the phenomena noticeable in Poland primarily attested 
the progressing modernisation: “the point is to quit a natural fertility 
1 Leon Dyczewski, Rodzina polska i kierunki jej przemian (Warszawa, 1981), 112.
2 Warsaw, Central Archives of Modern Records (Archiwum Akt Nowych [herein-
after: AAN]), Press clippings of the Centre for Documentation and Programme 
Collections, TVP SA [Polish Television], 21/4, [section:] ‘Population’, incl. (i.a.): 
Edward Rosset, ‘O perspektywiczną politykę ludnościową’, Perspektywy (24 Dec. 
1971); ‘Dlaczego liczba ludności Polski musi rosnąć? Konferencja Demografi czna 
w Oddziale Stow. PAX we Wrocławiu’, ed. by Krystyna Drozd, Słowo Powszechne 
(15 June 1972); ‘Lata 1973–1978 zdecydują o przyszłości Polski. Rozmowa z doc. 
dr. Stefanem Kurowskim’, Kierunki (10 Dec. 1972); Jan Dangel, ‘Konieczność 
raportu’, Słowo Powszechne (27 Nov. 1973); ‘Portret statystycznego Polaka’, Trybuna 
Ludu (4–5 Jan. 1975); Krystyna Drozd, ‘Dziś lepiej, ale jutro’, Słowo Powszechne 
(11–12 Dec. 1976).
3 Zbigniew Smoliński, ‘Reprodukcja ludności w świetle postaw prokreacyjnych 
nowożeńców’, Studia demografi czne, lxi–lxii, 3–4 (1980), 133.
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in favour of the rational one”. Natural fertility, with the resulting 
multi-children families, “implied primitive conditions of living, a low 
civilisation and cultural standard, almost complete lack of medical care, 
low sanitary and sexual culture, undereducation, and a procreative 
mentality and lifestyle shaped in such conditions”.4 “The changes that 
have taken place in this respect are an objective and irreversible process, 
testifying to the fact that Poland now ranks among the developed 
countries as far as population relations are concerned.”5
The idea of modernity suggested by this demography and female 
fertility expert can be regarded as universal to the European reality of 
the time. Smoliński equated modernity primarily with knowledge-based 
civilisation, with special focus on medical knowledge and egalitaria-
nisation of the living standard which ensured common access to the 
achievements of medicine. Such revisited ‘attitude toward procreation’ 
can be regarded as one of the important signs of modernity of socialism 
as a social-political system.
Central to the expert utterances of the period was, most of the time, 
the Polish family and the issue of how to control it by means other 
than the demographic potential. This essay seeks to take a closer look 
at the problem of modernity in the post-war communist Poland through 
the prism of concepts and ideas of model family and possibilities of 
shaping it, as promoted in the expert discourse and guidance practices. 
On the interpretation level, it is important to refer to modern – that 
is, rational and expert knowledge-propelled – social control methods, 
strictly connected with the concepts or ideas of modern society. In my 
view, the crucial aspect is the tension between biopolitics understood 
in terms of actions and strategies of modern dictatorship devised to 
control a population and the concepts of modernity that appeared in 
expert discourses in the context of, i.a., decreasing natality, modern 
birth control methods or practices related to maternity and paternity. 
Analysed are experts’ opinions proving dominant in the discourse, 
including the arguments put forth at sessions of the Family Council 
(Rada do spraw Rodziny)6 and the Planned Parenthood Association
4 Idem, ‘W kierunku nowoczesności’, Trybuna Ludu (20 Dec. 1977); cf. idem, 
‘Najlepszy jest “złoty środek”’, Trybuna Ludu (12–13 May 1979).
5 Smoliński, ‘W kierunku nowoczesności’.
6 Affi liated to the Council of Ministers, the Family Council was set up in 1978 
on initiative of Edward Gierek, the then-First Secretary of the Central Committee, 
Polish United Workers’ Party; the body functioned till 1988.
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(Towarzystwo Świadomego Macierzyństwa, TŚM).7 The timeframe of the 
analysis is, on the one hand, based on the ‘expert breakthrough’ of the 
Gierek decade (December 1970 – September 1980) – the phenomenon 
that, to my mind, should be an important element in the discussion on 
modernisation in Poland in the latter half of the twentieth century; on 
the other hand, it is set within the context of the deepening politico-
economic crisis, which is an aspect of interest from the standpoint of 
modernisation postulates. It needs being emphasised that the debate 
on the topic of our interest intensifi ed primarily (and expectedly) in 
the years 1970–81.
II
MODERNISATION PROCESSES AND BIOPOLITICS
The notions of ‘modernity’ and ‘modernisation’ seem omnipresent 
in the period’s discourse. A modern state, modern family, or modern 
construction industry were among the fi xed elements of a common 
idea of the world and vision of the future that reappeared in various 
contexts of the public debate in the People’s Republic of Poland.8 
However, the present considerations ought to take into account 
also the concept of communist regimes as ‘modern dictatorships’. 
Although communism as such is often regarded in terms other than 
a ‘modern regime’ and named, after Johann P. Arnson, an ‘anti-
modern’ or pseudo-modern formation, an incarnation of retarded-
ness or economic/social regress(ion), it has to be accepted that the 
postulate of communist ideology was originally rooted in the postulate 
of modernity.9 No systematic considerations in this particular area 
7 The Planned Parenthood Association (established 1957; 1971–8: as the Polish 
Society for Family Planning; since 1979: Society for Family Development) was an 
organisation composed of physicians and social/political activists, which offered 
family counselling as well as gynaecological and obstetrics services. In its early 
years, the Association consciously built upon the heritage of pre-war social 
organisations propagating birth control: Warsaw-based League for the Reform of 
Mores and Morals and Cracow-based Planned Parenthood Association.
8 Section II and III hereof refer, i.a., to the fi ndings and refl exions on ‘mod-
ernisation’ and the notion of ‘modern family’ proposed in my study entitled Rodzina, 
tabu i komunizm w Polsce, 1956–1989 [Family, taboo, and communism in Poland, 
1956–89] (Kraków, 2015).
9 Johann P. Arnson‚ ‘Communism and Modernity‘, Daedalus, cxxix, 1 (2000), 
61–90.
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have yet been proposed with respect to post-war Poland (except for 
Wojciech Musiał’s book which, however, focuses on the economic 
dimension of modernisation – this aspect being of secondary impor-
tance in the context of the issues in question10).
In my opinion the notion of ‘modern dictatorship’, introduced into 
the historiographical vocabulary by Jürgen Kocka, seems on-point. 
Viewed in terms of the conviction that the world is cognisable, ensuing 
from belief in science and the potential to control nature, rationality 
is usually regarded as the basic characteristic feature of modernisa-
tion. Rationality moreover implies the development of contemporary 
bureaucracies, that is, methods of administering based upon detailed 
and clear rules. The catalogue of basic features of modernity lists, 
necessarily, industrialisation and urbanisation, increased social mobility, 
and economism – the latter being directly correlated with increased 
production and consumption.11 However, Kocka argues, modernity is 
not, and does not have to be, synonymous of ‘democratic’, ‘progressive’, 
or – in broader terms – ‘good’.12 He thus quits the valuating context 
of the notion, describable as ‘realisation of the idea of progress, the 
peak of the development of Western civilisation’.13 On the contrary, 
Kocka reminds us that in the twentieth century modernity was often 
connected with processes leading to destruction and tragedy. The 
processes being most frequently associated with modernisation, such 
as industrialisation or development of education, were not infrequently 
imposed with use of brutal methods, causing in effect the annihilation 
of whole social groups. The inadequacy of the employed methods, 
evident against the attained socio-political effects, renders enormously 
diffi cult formulating a defi nite evaluation of certain phenomena related 
to modernisation. All the more, then – in Kocka’s opinion – it is legiti-
mate to apply the notion in the Eastern Bloc context. A modern nature 
of a dictatorship, Kocka argues, is primarily based on a bureaucratic 
administration, modern methods of social control and mobilisation 
(from propaganda to an extensive supervision and invigilation system), 
10 Wojciech Musiał, Modernizacja Polski. Polityki rządowe w latach 1918–2004 
(Toruń, 2013).
11 Ibidem, 34.
12 Jürgen Kocka, ‘The GDR. A Special Kind of Modern Dictatorship’, in Konrad H.
Jarausch (ed.), Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-cultural History of the GDR 
(New York and Oxford, 1999), 19.
13 Musiał, Modernizacja Polski, 35.
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or the leading role of a mass political party. A linkage occurs between 
modernisation of the state in terms of industrialisation, and a turn 
toward a knowledge-based social policy, as a broad concept.
In its version carried out by Edward Gierek’s team, the modernisa-
tion of the state appeared multifaceted. The process, usually identifi ed 
with a rampant industrialisation, was implemented in parallel with 
a turn toward a knowledge-based social policy, which in my opinion is 
describable in terms of ‘expert turn’. The leadership team welcomed 
the cooperation with scientifi c milieus, making attempts to directly 
harness them to the mechanisms legitimising the modernisation leap 
policy.14 Many a specialist emphasised a benefi cial climate for studies 
in Polish family, which was characteristic of the period; a number of 
interdepartmental institutions or teams were set up to coordinate the 
expert research.15 Financial support provided by the state enabled to 
start up a centralised family research scheme, run by Zbigniew Tyszka 
of Poznań.16 However, in spite of enormously increased interest in these 
issues, experts close to the central institutions did not always highly 
respect the research’s outcome. Maria Trawińska, member of the Family 
Council, summarised the trend in severely critical terms, in 1980: 
“in spite of increased interest in the research amongst sociologists, 
psychologists, or pedagogues, the development of theoretical research 
(particularly as far as sociology of family is concerned) proved adequate 
neither to the theoretical nor practical needs of the social policy”.17
A structured and extended institutional system was meant to 
implement the ideas based on the foundation of the sociologists’ and 
14 Cf. Daniel Wincenty, ‘Socjologia nieposłuszna w PRL? O funkcjonowaniu 
Zakładu Socjologii Norm i Patologii Społecznej w Instytucie Profi laktyki Społecznej 
i Resocjalizacji w latach 1972–1976’, in Paweł Łuczeczko and Daniel Wincenty 
(eds.), Jedna nauka – wiele historii. Dzieje subdyscyplin socjologicznych w Polsce (Gdań sk, 
2010), 36–57.
15 Józefa Pielkowa, Rodzina samotnej matki jako środowisko wychowawcze (Katowice, 
1983), 18.
16 The fi rst programme run by Tyszka in 1976–80 was entitled ‘Family in the 
period of construction of a developed socialist society’ and attracted a hundred 
research scholars from all over the country. The subsequent scheme, ‘The condition 
and transformations of Polish family in 1976–85’, was conducted in 1981–5 as 
a follow-up of its predecessor. The third (‘The condition and transformations of 
contemporary Polish families’) encompassed the research done in 1986–90. For 
more on the team’s research output, see Klich-Kluczewska, Rodzina, tabu i komunizm.
17 Maria Trawińska, Obszary niewiedzy o rodzinie w Polsce (Warszawa, 1980).
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economists’ knowledge. What it implied was quitting ad hoc interven-
tional action in favour of meeting the concrete soci(et)al purposes, 
as a basis for the building of a broad welfare state. The development 
of bureaucracy was other characteristic (and consequent) trait of 
this vision. In 1972, a Ministry of Labour, Wages and Social Affairs 
was established, to which the Social Insurance Institution (Zakład 
Ubezpieczeń Społecznych) reported; thus, a bureaucratic system was 
developed, which became known as ‘the state’s social administration’.18 
At last, once the resumption of an ‘active demographic policy’ was 
trumpeted, a special Governmental Commission for coordination of 
interdepartmental population policy-related actions was established 
(in 1974).19 In such a way motherhood and maternity were inserted 
into the machinery of modern social control. Population policy was 
moreover associated with the internal migration policy, with the 
underlying assumption that population movement ought to be mas-
terminded in a way to make Poles migrate to smaller urban hubs and 
resolve to set up families with one or, possibly, two children (so-called 
‘moderate concentration policy’).20
Modern democratic, as well as authoritarian, political regimes are 
said to bear a potential of making use of biopolitical mechanisms 
which, to my mind, constitute – along with modernity – another 
important context for analysis of the concepts about family in the 
late-socialist People’s Republic. Almost all biopolitics theoreticians 
admit that the notion, however ambiguous, has carved out a pretty 
respectable career during the last decade. As Thomas Lemke puts it, 
the notion of biopolitics
[a] few years ago … was known only to a limited number of experts, but 
it is used today in many different disciplines and discourses. Beyond the 
limited domain of specialists, it is also attracting increasing interest among 
the general public. The term is used to discuss political asylum policies, 
as well as the prevention of AIDS and questions of demographic change. 
… Some argue strongly that ‘biopolitics’ is necessarily bound to rational 
18 Jan Rosner, ‘Podmioty polityki społecznej’, in Antoni Rajkiewicz (ed.), Polityka 
społeczna (Warszawa, 1975), 66–7.
19 Mikołaj Latuch, ‘Wpływ przeobrażeń demografi czno-społecznych na politykę 
ludnościową w Polsce Ludowej’, in idem and Maria Namysłowska (eds.), Polityka 
społeczna. Uwarunkowania demografi czne, zadania, potrzeby (Warszawa, 1980), 67, 70–2.
20 Kazimierz Dziewoński, ‘Problemy ludnościowe w polskim planowaniu 
regionalnym’, in Polityka społeczna. Uwarunkowania demografi czne, 103–6.
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decision-making and the democratic organization of social life, while others 
link the term to eugenics and racism. The term fi gures prominently in 
texts of the Old Right, but is also used by representatives of the New Left. 
It is used by both critics and advocates of biotechnological progress, by 
committed Marxists and unapologetic racists.21
I will refer to biopolitics following Michel Foucault’s description 
whereby it is a form of exercising power, a system in which natural 
sciences, humanities and the normative concepts determine political 
goals, whereas human life becomes subject to sober assessment.22 The 
latter attitude calls for a knowledge that enables management of not 
individuals but a collective entity – that is, population; such knowledge 
is primarily offered by statistics and demography, which enables to 
create various strategies of correcting errors and developing optimal 
solutions through implementing concrete normative, disciplining, 
or therapeutic solutions.23 The previous analyses of biopolitics – for 
example, the one done in the context of twentieth-century history 
of Germany – attested to a critical difference between biopolitics 
practised under democratic and authoritarian conditions. In Dickinson’s 
opinion, as far as interactions between specifi ed social groups and 
individuals are concerned, politics in democratic circumstances ‘lives 
a life of its own’ and becomes subject to alteration – not always to 
the technocrats’ liking. This is how a phenomenon occurs which he 
describes as ‘participative biopolitics’, as utterly contrasting with 
non-modifi able politics of authoritarian countries, controlled from 
higher-up. This approach has been nuanced by Erik G. Huneke who, 
in his interesting analysis of family counselling in the communist East 
Germany, takes advantage of Daphne Hahn’s observation that the local 
authorities gradually departed from a repressive policy, promoting 
instead the regulation of births on one’s own (through access to birth 
control agents, abortion, and sexological consulting): a ‘soft’ policy 
that suggested certain solutions rather than imposed restrictions 
on solutions. The theory of potential negotiability of biopolitics is, 
seemingly, closer to Foucault’s concept, if one takes into account 
his conviction that the ‘authority’ operates not through a negative 
21 Thomas Lemke, Biopolitics. An Advanced Introduction, trans. by Eric F. Trump 




repression but rather, through producing ‘positive effects’. Thus, it 
acts by way of inspiration and encouragement, facilitation, offering 
of possibilities, production of models to follow and of desires in the 
spaces of everyday realities.24
The use of analysis of the biopolitics in post-war communist Poland 
is advantageous in that it makes us take more note of processes 
proving common to socio-political transformations taking place in 
Europe in the latter half of the twentieth century. What it also does 
is demonstrate the unobvious reasons behind the diminishing role 
of ideology, at least in terms of political pragmatics, owing to the 
increasing role of rational knowledge – a ‘practical knowledge of life’, 
in this particular case.
III
THE IMAGINED MODERN FAMILY
In 1990, Zbigniew Tyszka thus summarised the fi fteen years of 
research in Polish family:
Family has attracted attention of many, researchers included, as social group 
and institution of high importance and subjected to violent change. … The 
political/constitutional transition, the change in the family legislation, 
exponential industrialisation and the related urbanisation carried out in 
a once-typically agricultural country, intensifi ed geographical mobility caused 
by the industrial and urbanisation change and the shifted eastern, western 
and northern frontier of this country, massifi cation of female career oppor-
tunities, heavily altering the rhythm of everyday life and the arrangement of 
social positions within the family, and the fast and remarkable evolution 
of mores-and-morals: all this has caused intensive in-family processes, 
altering the situation of family in microstructural and macrostructural 
arrangements as well as in the entire global society, and impacted the models 
of family life and the family values. The positive changes were accompanied 
by confl icts and tensions.25
Finding the answer to the question of how the Polish family changed 
through the country’s modernisation imposed by the political system 
24 Ewa Biń czyk, ‘Nieklasyczna socjologia medycyny Michela Foucault: praktyki 
medykalizacji jako praktyki władzy’, in Włodzimierz Pią tkowski and Anna Titkow 
(eds.), W stronę socjologii zdrowia (Lublin, 2002), 182.
25 Zbigniew Tyszka, Ukształtowanie się i rozwój socjologii rodziny w Polsce (Poznań, 
1990), 11.
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was the basic task sociologists posed for themselves beginning with 
the late 1950s. That the country’s families changed was a certainty. 
Did equality of rights, egalitarianisation and democratisation of 
the relationships spread? Was the patriarchal family replaced by its 
‘modern’ nuclear counterpart? Did the citizens take advantage of the 
development opportunities offered by the state?26 A number of studies 
on urban and rural families in the communist Poland opened with 
a statement that the change was great and undisputable, some of the 
descriptions of the change being emotional and striking with optimism.
A transformation of family was thus made part of the modernisation 
project for Poland – resulting from economic and political changes, on 
the one hand, and as an autonomous, though not isolated, process of 
transformation of societal ideas and practices in the private space. That 
the state ought to ensure the family the right to privacy was basically 
not subject to doubt.27 In their analyses of the progress of modernisa-
tion, Polish sociologists made use of the methods of the American 
sociology as far as empirical research into family in industrialised 
space was concerned. The visible effects of the transformation might 
thus have included: increased divorce rate, dissemination of birth 
controls and decreased size of family, diminished authority of husband/
father, increase in extramarital sexual contacts, increased numbers 
of wage-earning married women, greater personal freedom of family 
members, the state taking over the custodial functions, laicisation of 
the morals, and a new way of functioning of the household.28
It was on this substratum that a peculiar ideal of modern egalitarian 
Polish family was elaborated: a family that was small, two-generational, 
where the husband and wife, both working and equal to each other, 
formed a durable intimate relationship. They consciously brought up 
26 “Promotion only depends upon the individual’s aspirations and labour, whilst 
education and personal qualifi cations are the indicators of social position”; 
cf. Barbara Łobodzińska, Rodzina w Polsce (Warszawa, 1974), 11–12.
27 As viewed by A. Dodziuk-Lityńska and D. Markowska, the right to privacy 
was an important element of the modernisation vision. Being a modern state that 
planned a soci(et)al policy, Poland should have respected the right of its members 
to privacy; see Anna Dodziuk-Lityńska and Danuta Markowska, Współczesna rodzina 
w Polsce (Warszawa, 1975), 8.
28 Tyszka, Ukształtowanie się i rozwój socjologii, 13; the author refers at this point 
to William F. Ogburn and Myer F. Nimkoff, Technology and the Changing Family 
(Cambridge, MA, 1955). Z. Tyszka was a scholarship holder in the U.S. in the 
academic year 1962/3.
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and educated their children (usually, two per family) being assisted to 
this end by public (state-run) care and education facilities. Referring 
to scholars investigating American urban areas, Renata Siemieńska 
complemented the pattern with the importance of consumption. 
Modern consumption eliminated production of goods in the private 
space and extra-family relations of individual family members.29 
As a model, Polish socialist family was thus nothing particular when 
seen in the context of the sociological thought of its time. As part of the 
so-called fi rst modernity, family in European and American countries 
was meant to be moulded by industry and the state. “It was then that 
the ‘regular (that is, nuclear) family’ was shaped, deviations from 
which were labelled [by experts] as aberrances, if not pathologies.”30
Most Polish sociological studies carried out in the last two decades 
of the communist Poland was based on comparisons of the reality 
against the ideal thus described, which had been developed out of 
a standardised model of urban intelligentsia family. Thus, the bar was 
set pretty high – much higher that Poland’s complex socio-political and 
cultural reality, not much prone to such generalisations, could reach. 
The fi ndings claiming that the nuclear family model proved victori-
ous are particularly doubtful today, also among sociologists. Already 
then most such generalisations were counterpointed by numerous 
objections. With the theoretically dominant ‘small-sized family’, as 
Barbara Łobodzińska observed, even in urban conditions it was often 
the case that scarcity of residential facilities or the necessity for the 
elder generation to care about their offspring’s children caused that 
many a young family continuously resided together with their parents. 
Among the concrete examples quoted by the scholar, 67 per cent 
of the polled aged over sixty-fi ve in Piotrków region still lived with 
their children. This was true not only for farmers (78 per cent) but 
for white-collar workers as well (55 per cent).31 A dominant share 
of three-generational family has also been found by Anna Kotlarska-
Michalska or Maria Trawińska (up to 60 per cent). A well-informed 
conclusion is that most people aspired for a nuclear family but proved 
to be incapable of fulfi lling this model.
29 Renata Siemieńska, Nowe życie w nowym mieście (Warszawa, 1969), 333–4.
30 Tomasz Szlendak, ‘Interpretacje kryzysu rodziny w socjologii. Mię dzy familij-
nym fundamentalizmem a rewolucją styló w ż ycia’, Studia Socjologiczne, 4 (2008), 37.
31 Łobodzińska, Rodzina w Polsce, 31.
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Family was, moreover, a very important element of the period’s 
models of novel modern city versus rurality, a pair that formed 
a dychotomic image of the social reality of the time, which in fact 
was much more complex. Kazimierz Dobrowolski, a leading Polish 
sociologist at the time, had the most signifi cant role in developing 
the paradigm. Based on source material dating to the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, Dobrowolski had already in the 1930s 
proposed a description of rural community which in his perception 
was “small, isolated, illiterate, and homogeneous, with a strongly 
developed sense of group solidarity”. The rural community, he 
observed, was governed by a conventionalised lifestyle with no room 
for legislation or intellectual refl exion.32 For the rural environment, 
kinship and family is central, the sphere of the sacred dominating 
over the secular. As emphasised by Izabella Bukraba-Rylska, this was 
one of the then-prevailing observations whereby traditional culture 
was archaic and primitive, simple and sustainable. The model of 
traditional peasant culture was to act as an ideal system where all 
the products or works, “objects, value systems, sets of social norms 
and rules of institutional organisation, as well as types of personality 
characteristic of this particular culture, all form a coherent structure 
of mutually conditional phenomena and facts; or, at least, detectable 
in them is a shared permanent pattern: a testimony and expression 
of their attribution to a certain style”.33
The model that permeated the thought of Dobrowolski and his circle 
was the fi rst factor that contributed to an almost complete dominance 
of expert model observance of the phenomena occurring in Poland, 
with use of a dichotomous cultural clash perspective: traditional rural 
vs. modern urban. The historical experience of internal/external migra-
tions, development of popular culture (Franciszek Adamski’s research 
being an exception) or emergence of new hybrid cultures were not taken 
into account. Added to that was anti-ruralism, based on a conviction 
that “rural environments are the mainstay of conservativism and forces 
inimical to progress, … pre-condemned to liquidation”. Such a vision 
of the rural environment meant a schematic and simplifi ed percep-
tion of rural community, neglecting any diversity and marginalising
32 Izabella Bukraba-Rylska, ‘Na styku kultur: kategorie poznawcze i dylematy 
moralne’, Mazowieckie Studia Humanistyczne, iii, 1 (1997), 149.
33 Ibidem, 150.
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the ever-present social mobility. As a result, sociologists developed 
a fi xed, schematic image of the countryside which, as Bukraba-Rylska 
points out, had in fact never been the case.34 A ‘simplifi ed image of 
the countryside’ – or, rather, a specifi c static perspective assumed 
in the analysis of rural environment – was identifi ed by Włodzimierz 
Mędrzecki, who emphasised that the rural family had been subject 
to change since the late nineteenth century.35
IV
POPULATION MICRO-POLICY
‘Small-sized healthy family’: resource optimisation
and disciplining
Biopolitical practices are observable with the peculiar barometer of 
state birth control policies and/or promotion of knowledge on sexu-
ality, as embodied by the Planned Parenthood Association. It was 
a unique institution among the organisations active in post-war com-
munist Poland, although its history does not formally divert from 
those of other centrally controlled associations that operated within 
the framework of censorship-determined public space of the four and 
a half post-war decades. Dating its tradition to the interwar period, 
the Association re-entered the public space after the 1956 Thaw as, 
essentially, an entirely new organisation that had moreover to operate 
under conditions extremely different from those which had shaped 
its image twenty-fi ve years before. The functioning of the Association 
was for quite a long time identifi ed with the post-October ’56 anti-
natalist policy pursued by the Polish government, which is commonly 
believed to have begun with the law admitting legal abortion, put into 
effect as from 7 April 1956. The date marked, in parallel, a symboli-
cal end of the Stalinist policy that promoted fertility and natality under 
34 For more on this point, see eadem, Służebna i służalcza rola socjologii oraz inne 
kwestie. Wybór artykułów z lat 2007–2009 (Warszawa, 2009), 7–41.
35 Włodzimierz Mędrzecki, ‘Kobieta w warstwie chłopskiej i przemiany jej 
pozycji w II połowie XIX i pierwszej połowie XX wieku’, in Anna Żarnowska (ed.), 
Pamiętnik XV Powszechnego Zjazdu Historyków Polskich, ii: Przemiany społeczne a model 
rodziny (Gdańsk, 1995), 33–7; idem, ‘Intymność i sfera prywatna w życiu codziennym 
i obyczajach rodziny wiejskiej w XIX i w pierwszej połowie XX wieku’, in Dobrochna 
Kałwa, Adam Walaszek, and Anna Żarnowska (eds.), Rodzina – prywatność – intym-
ność. Dzieje rodziny polskiej w kontekście europejskim (Warszawa, 2005), 105–21.
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the slogan of rebuilding the Polish population, following its destruc-
tion during the war.36
According to the extant documents and accounts of activists asso-
ciated with the Cracow and Poznań branches of the organisation, 
the latter initially focused on implementing the aforesaid law, with 
a vast majority of (female) patients reporting at the clinic with an 
abortion referral. Hence, the Association propagated the awareness 
of contraception and its use, employing a variety of means to this 
end: from pamphlets through to educational footages,37 approaching 
the campaign as a form of counteracting abortion. Since a broad 
spectrum of actions aimed at disseminating various contraceptives 
(pharmacological and mechanical, made by Securitas, a manufacturer 
name-sponsored by the Association) among Polish women proved 
ineffi cient – which is somewhat astonishing today – some radical 
ideas cropped up to apply special sanctions against those women 
who tenaciously “resist the use any reasonable prevention method 
and instead report several times for having an abortion”: for example, 
by imposing an extra fee for the procedure.38 Appeals were made on 
a regular basis to enhance the quality of contraceptive produced at 
home, launch automatic dispensers offering contraceptives, importation 
and application of foreign oral contraceptives – particularly in the 
latter half of the 1960s, when the contraceptive pill was approaching 
its heyday in the Western markets.39
36 Barbara Klich-Kluczewska, ‘Making up for the losses of war: Reproduction 
politics in Postwar Poland’, in Ruth Leiserowitz and Maren Röger (eds.), Women 
and Men at War: A Gender Perspective on World War II and its Aftermath in Central and 
Eastern Europe (Osnabrück, 2012), 307–28.
37 The fi rst instructional footage entitled Jak zapobiegać ciąży? (How to prevent 
pregnancy?) was produced on the Association’s commission by the Educational 
Film Studio (Wytwórnia Filmów Oświatowych) in 1960.
38 Poznań, State Archives (Archiwum Państwowe w Poznaniu [hereinafter: APP]), 
Society for Family Development, Branch of Poznań (Towarzystwo Rozwoju Rodziny 
Oddział w Poznaniu [hereinafter: TRR Poznań]) 4809/7, Records of the Provincial 
Board of TŚM in Poznań, Record of 23 March 1961, 24.
39 APP, TRR Poznań 4809/7, Records of the Provincial Board of TŚM in Poznań, 
Arguments proposed for the Second Provincial Convention, 18 Dec. [19]64. For 
more on dissemination of contraceptives in Poland, see Agata Ignaciuk, ‘Clueless 
about contraception. The introduction and circulation of the contraceptive pill in 
state-socialist Poland (1960s–1970s)’, Medicina nei Secoli. Arte e Scienza / Journal of 
History of Medicine, xxvi, 2 (2014), 509–36.
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The inclination to penalise women and men who would have 
neglected the rational regulation of their own fertility was, beside 
the promotion of contraception, a very characteristic trait of the 
fi rst, and pretty vital, stage in the Association’s development in 
the 1960s. The conclusions from the First Convention of the Planned 
Parenthood Association as well as the detailed motions proposed 
at its Second Convention indicated a variety of ideas of how to 
control those who ought to be deprived of the right to propagation, 
and what sanctions to apply with respect to them; in terms of the 
Foucaultian concept, such persons would have been excluded from 
the biopolitical body in the name of the socioeconomic benefi t of the 
community. Some of those actions are immediately qualifi able as 
rooted in the pre-war eugenics tradition. The Association activ-
ists, then mainly gynaecologists and midwives, also journalists and 
directors of State-owned enterprises, made efforts to collaborate in 
the mid-1960s, for instance, with the Anti-tuberculosis Society for 
free-of-charge distribution of contraceptives among the patients in 
order to prevent childbirths in a ‘tuberculous environment’. Vol-
untary sterilisation and certain forms of coerced sterilisation were 
proposed – the latter “in schizophreniacs, imbeciles or confi rmed 
alcoholics, whenever such individuals already had several children”.40 
Moreover, the Association confi rmed the project, widely debated on in 
the press, to introduce compulsory premarital examinations for both 
prospective spouses.
While in Poznań the focus was primarily on the aforementioned 
tuberculosis-stricken patients’ milieu, the activists in Cracow pointed, 
as the target of activity in favour of ‘rational fertility’, to indigent 
mothers of several children – thus combining the research on new 
contraceptives carried out under the patronage of the Cracow Medical 
Academy’s First Clinic of Gynaecological Disorders with counteracting 
excessive natality:
The [female] patients assigned for these examinations are selected from 
low-income circles, with numerous children; they cannot bear the costs and 
will themselves be subjected to scientifi c experiments. Given the calculated 
value of rendering of such services, a separate subsidy for the Clinic will 
be a must, so as to get the Clinic’s budget balanced. It is envisioned that 
40 APP, TRR Poznań 4809/7, Records of the Provincial Board of TŚM in Poznań, 
Arguments proposed for the Second Provincial Convention.
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within a half-year period experiments will be carried out on fi fty patients, 
the value of the examination being approx. 400 zł[oty].41
It is hard to clearly fi nd today whether actions of this sort did in fact 
promote the Association as an avant-garde institution in the modern 
thinking of family – or, just the opposite, earned it opponents.
Endeavours for extending medical care and patronage to entire 
factory crews were of a similar nature – one example being the 
attempts made outside Cracow in the summer of 1966, includ-
ing in the ‘Fablok’ Railway Engine Factory in Chrzanów. As one 
of the instructors reported, resulting from his strivings, the plant 
managers
are willing to organise at their place two or three lectures on family planning, 
for their staff. They want the lectures to be delivered by a physician of our 
Association. They can supply attendees and cover the expense according 
to the rules in force. The ‘site preparation’ done, they would like to have 
a TSM [= Association] Club set up and a gynaecologist invited from our 
Clinic, who would practise for some time, 1X [= once] in a week, in the 
local Clinic, in the morning or afternoon hours. On their part, they will 
provide an appropriately equipped consulting room with a nurse on duty, 
who could have been trained with the TSM prior to that. Women would 
be released to go and see a doctor during their working hours. The Works’ 
Council should like, in one throw, extend the care to women with many 
children (this would basically include consulting on contraception and, 
possibly, examination in view of early detection of cancer). The analytical 
laboratory operating in situ can perform some basic examinations. The 
Works’ Council is capable of allocating some funding for the purpose 
(2,000–3,000 zł[oty]).42
An example of controlling action was, in turn, an attempt to push 
through the principle that
a woman enjoying maternity leave receives from the physician a referral 
for a partial leave, after which she would be obligated to report at her 
doctor’s to obtain a further certifi cate entitling her to use the remainder of 
41 Cracow, National Archives (Archiwum Narodowe w Krakowie [hereinafter: 
ANKr]), Society for Family Development (Towarzystwo Rozwoju Rodziny [hereinafter: 
TRR]) 1435/16, Record 14/65, 15 Nov. 1965.
42 ANKr, TRR 1435/16, Report on the site visit of 24 Aug. 1966 to the Railway 
Engine Factory in Chrzanów.
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the leave, and she would simultaneously receive an appropriate instruction 
of how to prevent an unwelcome pregnancy.43
This was an exemplary attempt at a broader impact on the state’s 
population policy. The proposals to simply reverse the Stalinist 
large-family propagation system were similar: it was postulated that 
allowances be abolished from the fi fth child on. In contrast to the 
actions aimed at propagation of contraception, believed to have been 
pursued by the Association, the ideas to adjust the social policy have 
remained theoretical – similarly to the eugenics-inspired sterilisation 
ideas, which (perhaps somewhat exaggeratingly) can be interpreted 
today as a token of the authorities’ mistrust toward that particular 
expert lobby. From the standpoint of abortion and demographic trans-
formation statistics, the most effi cient population-controlling action 
was the law – that is, the 1956 act, which – in contrast to modern 
pregnancy prevention methods propagated by the Association – did not 
introduce medical knowledge into the space of nuptial intimacy (and 
not only). Hence, it would be rather hard to give evidence in support 
of Zbigniew Smoliński’s optimistic argument that links optimised 
reproduction on the individual level to the development of a modern 
sanitary and sexual culture.
‘Happy nuclear family’: corrective and therapeutic action
and this is really bloodily important, that from what we do it may follow, 
exactly, how to live. That we’re willing to model it up, that we want to show 
it off, and care much about it; that it is, in principle, a school of societal 
and political life, across its aspects.
This quotation from a 1977 featured documentary directed by Marcel 
Łoziński perfectly renders the turn that occurred in the thinking about 
family in the last two decades of the People’s Republic. Uttered by 
a psychotherapist, these phrases suggest that the operations or pro-
cedures that were meant to shape the situation of humans and choices 
made by them within their closest (family/relatives) circle, appeared 
much more complex and deeply embedded in theoretical knowledge 
43 APP, TRR Poznań 4809/7, Records of the Provincial Board of TŚM in Poznań, 
Arguments proposed for the Second Provincial Convention.
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that it might seem. These words moreover confi rm the need, as 
declared by the authorities, to infl uence the processes in question by 
intermediation of experts.
The theoretical retreat from a ‘small-sized healthy family’ marked 
a basic effect of depopulation threats and a resumption, attested since 
the late 1960s, of a ‘moderate pro-natalist policy’ (to use the period’s 
phrase). A drop trend in the natality rates, primarily for educated and 
working women, was confi rmed by the empirical studies done by 
demographers from academic institutions and the Central Statistical 
Offi ce (Główny Urząd Statystyczny, GUS) in 1966 and 1970.44 Proactive 
intervention was moreover provoked by the fi ndings based on the 
situation observable in the adjacent Soviet Bloc-member countries. 
The population situation in Czechoslovakia and Hungary was found 
particularly disturbing. Whereas experts emphasised that, owing 
to a longer period of infl uence of the effects of the compensational 
demographic explosion, Poland’s situation was way better than that 
of Czechoslovakia or East Germany (GDR), where labour shortages 
appeared on the threshold of the 1970s. However, remedial actions 
taken in such countries were diligently followed.45
A radical turn in the priorities and Edward Gierek’s vision of 
a Poland populated by forty million by the year 2000, proposed 
as a “task for Polish mothers to do” within the fi ve-year period of 
1976–80,46 somewhat shook the Association activists, although, to 
my mind, it did not lead to its complete marginalisation. Whilst the 
organisation had ceased by then to be a player capable of proactively 
contributing to a natalist policy, and thus raising or acquiring funds 
44 Kazimierz Romaniuk, ‘Konferencja poświęcona współczesnym problemom 
polityki ludnościowej, 15–18 marca 1972, Jadwisin’, Studia Demografi czne, xxxii 
(1973), 117.
45 Kazimierz Dzienio, Andrzej Józefowicz, and Mikołaj Latuch, ‘O przesłankach 
i programie badań demografi cznych oraz polityki ludnościowej w Polsce’, Studia 
Demografi czne, xxxii (1973), 99, 108. Economics-oriented actions – such as increase 
in pecuniary benefi ts granted for the maternity leave period, child allowances/
benefi ts, one-off childbirth benefi t, relieves for families with children, baby layettes, 
etc. (as e.g. in Czechoslovakia) – were perceived in a positive manner. Administra-
tive instruments, as characteristic e.g. for Romania, were described as ineffi cient 
in the longer run.
46 Mikołaj Latuch, ‘Problemy demografi czne w aspekcie ekonomiczno-społecz-
nego rozwoju kraju’, in Elżbieta Tomza (ed.), Rodzina – zakład pracy – osiedle 
(Warszawa, 1978), 25.
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for a wide propagation of birth control, it did benefi t as a milieu that 
promoted modern methods of ‘family treatment’:
Further to the numerous articles published in daily and periodic press 
with respect to demographic forecasts, our activists have to explain at the 
meetings that the Association deals with no demographic policies but it 
does focus on the happy family, one for which planning … is crucial.47
Renamed now as the Society for Family Planning, the organisation 
had thus become, primarily, an integral part of the family counselling 
system that was described ten years later by Maria Trawińska, soci-
ologist and a leading expert with the Government, as ‘life counselling’: 
an activity that was theoretically meant to fulfi l the prophylactic 
function of ‘social didacticism’, rather than merely offer assistance or 
care.48 The activists had also to take into account the incessant com-
petition on the part of the Catholic Church whose family counselling 
offer, in the Christian morality spirit, was developed well enough for 
the government-sponsored Family Council to promote it as a model 
for the secular clinics to follow:
What I have to tell you is that, in an ideal fashion, I’ve only seen such 
counselling in just one place in this country, that is, in Niepokalanów, at 
the Franciscan Friars’. I happened to visit the place this May, with a group 
of foreigners who wanted to visit the [Fr. Maksymilian] Kolbe museum; at 
that point we found that a crowd of people had gathered there, families with 
their children, and so on, and I could see how it works. There is a psycholo-
gist, a musicologist, there’s everybody and they offer advice in a variety of 
matters. And you get a glass of tea free, everyone’s entitled [to get one]. So, 
this is the form of operation, I could see it for myself, and those masses of 
people coming along and writing testify that there’s a need for such com-
prehensive counsel. Can we possibly get [things] rationalised in our place?49
47 APP, TRR Poznań 4809/18, Family Planning Clinics 1971–80, Minutes of the 
Meeting of the Board, Society for Family Planning – Branch of Poznań, 27 Oct. 
1970, c. 6.
48 AAN, Family Council (Rada do spraw Rodziny [hereinafter: RdsR]) 1/10, 
Session of the Presidium of the Family Council. Finally, in the face of the develop-
ing crisis, the need to provide help and assistance will prevail, with the counselling 
system evolving towards rescuing functions rather than modernising ones (in the 
spirit of socialism) as initially ascribed to it.
49 AAN, RdsR 1/10, Session of the Presidium of the Family Council, opinion 
pronounced by Antoni Rajkiewicz.
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Indeed, the latter half of the 1960s and the subsequent decade 
saw in the circle of those involved in propagation of ‘Catholic family-
related morality’ an intensifying mobilisation to act, which was rooted 
in the belief that the traditional patterns of family life had faded 
away resulting from Western mass culture that penetrated Poland 
and, to an equal degree, from actions and negligence of the state 
whose institutions were accused of propagating liberalised trends in 
mores and morals. Karol Wojtyła (in offi ce as Pope John Paul II since 
1978) developed a scheme to counteract those trends, which he found 
disturbing. Hence the initiative to set up a Family Ministry Section 
as a separate entity, which initiated prenuptial preparatory sessions 
held in the parishes (the couple attended three meetings with the 
priest and were bound to learn the ethical ‘birth control’ methods); 
moreover, the Institute of Family was established (affi liated to the 
Pontifi cal Faculty of Theology), whose task was to train specialists to 
form the ministry’s competence base.50 Similarly as with the Planned 
Parenthood Association, physicians, obstetricians and nurses became 
the focal milieu. A special role was assigned in this respect to Wanda 
Półtawska,51 who eventually did not prove successful in this particular 
fi eld. Yet, she heavily contributed to the Kler-Med initiative that 
was based on inputs from a team of advanced-stage medicine and 
theology students, who were nicknamed ‘Półtawska’s soldiers’ by 
some mischievous people in Cracow.
According to an infl uential representative of the Family Council, 
the numerous patients visiting the clinics run by Church institutions 
were substantially indicative of the Church’s effi cient infl uence on 
family, thus serving as a model to follow. Catholic clinics did have at 
their disposal certain instruments none of their secular counterpart 
could ever have. In the latter case, anonymity was not ensured, use 
of a consulting service was not compulsory in view of civil marriage 
(save for underage marriage candidates), and patients were sometimes 
charged for the service (100–300 złoty per visit).52 A holistic approach 
50 AAN, RdsR 1/10, Session of the Presidium of the Family Council, 294–5.
51 Doctor of medicine, head of the Institute of Family Theology at the Pontifi -
cal Academy of Theology in Cracow (1969–99), longtime co-worker of Karol 
Wojtyła.
52 AAN, RdsR 1/10, Session of the Presidium of the Family Council, opinion 
proposed by Maria Trawińska: “The Laws allow for no anonymous counselling. For 
a therapy to be appropriate, the school headmaster and the National Council, and 
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to the patient was, all the same, not unknown to the Society clinics’ 
staff; obtaining advice from a medical specialist – a psychologist 
or sexologist, having a basic procedure carried out, and ordering 
a laboratory testing (for instance, cytological), became part of the 
care standard required by the headquarters for urban hubs hosting 
the clinics in province (voivodeship) capitals. This was probably the 
reason why the Cracow-based clinic gave, on average, 35,000 pieces 
of advice per annum, which was much in excess of the assumed fi gure 
(22,000) and made the institution strive for even more spacious 
premises where to operate.
A holistic approach to the patient – which, in Agnieszka Kościańska’s 
opinion, was characteristic of some leading Polish sexologists closely 
connected with the Association53 – was refl ected in modern family 
therapies applied by dedicated premarital and family clinics being set 
up at the time. A clinic in Poznań, established in 1972, was visited 
in the latter half of the 1970s by some 700 patients yearly – mainly 
married couples and those to become husband and wife. The clinic 
usually attracted patients struggling with sexological problems (such 
as frigidity or other) as well as problems such as lack of harmony in 
cohabitation or family animosities based on diverse characters or views 
regarding children’s upbringing. It was customary that the doctors 
consulted the individual cases with the psychologists on duty; tougher 
cases were discussed among specialists. From 1976 onwards family 
and prenuptial counselling in Poznań was predominantly based on 
various forms of therapy applied by psychologists, psycho-corrective/
psychotherapeutic ‘talk therapies’ among them: “Although calling for 
considerable effort, the latter form proves to be the most effi cient; if 
spread over a period, it ensures lasting effect.”
Encouraged by the positive effects and popularity of the clinic, 
Poznań doctors launched new forms of activity. In 1977, a method 
was initiated based on meetings with couples threatened with 
estrangement, lasting eight to nine hours each and thus called 
‘marathon [i.e. intensive] therapy’. In parallel, the standard, three or
four-hour-long sessions were held once in a week for two to three 
the housing-estate community board have all to be aware, in line with the social 
care idea”.
53 Agnieszka Kościańska, Płeć, przyjemność i przemoc. Kształtowanie wiedzy eksperc-
kiej o seksualności w Polsce (Warszawa, 2014), 39–41.
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months.54 The clinic furthermore employed other typical group 
techniques such as psychodrama, pantomime, sensitivity training, 
psychogymnastics, or constructive dispute resolution. The basic goal 
behind the sessions was “to improve the interpersonal communication 
between husband and wife, more completely identify one’s own and 
his/her partner’s needs or expectations, and bring about a change in 
the customary way of treating each other”.55
Antenatal classes or birthing schools was yet another form, worth 
mentioning at this point, of direct adaptation of knowledge (aspects 
of obstetric and paediatric knowledge, in this particular case) to 
everyday social practice. Although the fi rst such schools appeared with 
the October 1956 Thaw, on initiative of Dr Jadwiga Beaupré, in the 
1970s and 1980s they epitomised modernity and were documented 
on fi lm reels as an almost utopian illustration of the desired style of 
family life in communist Poland.56 Numerous attendance of males at 
Thursday classes in Cracow, broadly commented by the local press, 
prophesying the coming of an ‘era of fatherhood schools’, contributed 
to the popularity of such facilities in Poland.57
V
CONCLUSION
All the practices described above focused on married couple – an 
approach refl ected also in the numerous sexual education projects: 
the Planned Parenthood Association activists had endeavoured to 
introduce aspects of sexual education as part of school curriculum 
since the 1960s, and this prevailed in their actions in the People’s 
Republic’s last decade. Again, physicians and experts argued that 
procreation was ‘the highest species-related and social good’:
54 APP, TRR 4809/18, Family Planning Clinics 1971–80, Report on the opera-
tions of the Premarital and Family Clinic affi liated to the Provincial Branch of TPR 
[Family Planning Society] in Poznań for the year 1978’, c. 29.
55 APP, TRR 4809/18, Family Planning Clinics, 1971–80, Information re. group 
psychotherapy of married couples conducted at the Premarital and Family Clinic, 
TPR in Poznań.
56 Dojrzewanie do rodziny and W szkole rodzenia, both directed by Zygmunt 
Skonieczny, 1982.
57 ANKr, TRR 1435/18, Report of the Board, Society for Family Planning 1975 
(1 Jan. to 31 Dec. 1975).
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Young people have to be made clear, in the fi rst place, about the fact that 
matrimony cannot possibly be considered as a means of securing for oneself 
a monopoly for sexual partnership with the beloved person, but the social 
and species-specifi c sense of marriage consists in giving birth to one’s 
offspring and bringing them up as valuable people. The number of children 
ought to be consciously determined; they ought to come along in a time 
convenient for their parents, at planned moments.58
In parallel, the records under analysis testify to a very interesting 
mental change that stands out not in a general concept of modern 
family, which (has) remained relatively durable, but in the recom-
mended and applied means of attaining a utopian ideal – thus, in 
practices regarded as modern or innovative. In the 1960s, these prac-
tices remained deeply rooted in authoritarian natalist practices typical 
of the former half of the century, while the subsequent decade was 
marked with a resolute openness to soft methods based on negotiation 
and cooperation. It has to be kept in mind, though, that in either case 
remodelling of the family as an important link in the soci(et)al chain 
was the utmost objective. The sources under analysis, let us empha-
sise, are still not satisfactory enough to give an answer to a series of 
important questions. The major one concerns the actual sources of the 
mental turn, the possible options including a generational change 
among the experts, intensifi ed transfer of knowledge between the 
West and the East, and the context of a wider political transition.
trans. Tristan Korecki
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